

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

22 September 1969

25X1A5a1

SUBJECT : [REDACTED] Materials on China

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1. Attached are copies of (a) the [REDACTED] draft on Sino-Soviet relations, (b) Edgar Snow's piece on Mao for the STAR feature, and (c) ^{unclassified} two commentaries on Snow's piece, as requested by you on 19 September.

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2. [REDACTED] and I have both reviewed the Sino-Soviet draft. Neither of us would write it quite the way [REDACTED] did, 25X1A5a1 but it is generally sound and has no ^{clear} ~~apparent~~ errors of fact. Certain facts attributed to "intelligence reports" might be in error, but are based on alleged ~~photography~~ photography (a possible leak) which we can't comment on.

3. The longer commentary on Snow's piece was written jointly by SRS and OCI, and is meant to be hard-hitting, even polemical, to counter Snow's shameless admiration of Mao. This commentary is open to the objection, however, that the reader will feel that ~~he~~ he is simply being propagandized from the other direction. Therefore I have prepared a shorter, ^{milder} ~~shorter, milder, and more balanced~~ version which if anything understates the case against Mao, making the case almost entirely in terms of his treatment of the Chinese people. We want to give the STAR a choice, based on their own ^{journalistic} ~~own~~ judgment ^{as to} ~~of~~ which type of commentary would more effectively balance Snow's. Or [REDACTED] 25X1A can write its own commentary, taking what it likes from these, without hurting our feelings.

Resp.,

Mao has ably formulated the theory and carried out the practice of guerrilla warfare. But beyond that, the case for Mao's "greatness" is the same case as for the "greatness" of Stalin, whom Mao admired and still holds up as an example.

Mao is a totalitarian. After achieving power, he first bent his energies to imposing a brutal dictatorship on his country. In the first years of Communist rule, several millions were killed, and scores of millions ruined, in the campaigns against "counter-revolutionaries" and for the organization of rural areas. Personal freedom was extinguished, on principle.

Mao is a fanatic. Obsessed by war, he has made the main aim of his foreign policy that of weakening and finally destroying the United States through revolutionary wars all over the world. When able to give effective support to his friends--as in Korea and Vietnam--he has helped to impose regimes as savage and bloody as his own. Elsewhere in the world, his friendly counsel has been simply that of inciting reckless and suicidal ventures. In his furious dispute with the Soviet party since the late fifties--centering on this question of strategy--he has set back China's development in all fields and left Peking without a military ally.

Mao cannot be trusted. In the "hundred flowers" campaign of the mid-fifties, he first encouraged intellectuals to

express criticism of the party and then broke them for it. More recently, after inciting Chinese youth to destroy the Chinese Communist party, he has turned against the young and put them in labor camps.

Mao lives in a fantasy. In the "great leap forward" of the late fifties, he leaped from one fantasy to another and ended in collapse. (There are some signs that he means to try it again.) Currently, his belief that he has produced reliable "revolutionary successors" is another such fantasy.

Mao cannot admit a mistake. In 1959, when a group of his lieutenants rightly pointed out the bad results of policies based on fanaticism and fantasy, he simply purged them.

Mao is insatiably vain. While conducting China from one disaster to another, he has insisted on a personal adulation exceeding that demanded even by Stalin.

All of these traits of character have been expressed in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the late sixties. Having alienated most of his remaining lieutenants in the early sixties, Mao in 1965 launched another "revolution" to degrade and purge his old comrades. He accomplished this, but at the cost of again setting back China's economic and military development, and destroying the educational system. Ironically, he has ended by being dependent on the army, most of whose leaders are no more sympathetic to his policies than the party ^{apparatus} machine had been.

He has not even had the excuse of a glorious objective, unless one sees the ruin of the United States as that. The new Chinese man--whom a series of "cultural revolutions" is supposedly to produce--would be a super-politicized ignoramus, with no thought but Mao's, purged of human feeling and filled with slogans and hatred, living and working like an ant and prepared to die on signal.

Mao has been able for twenty years to exploit the intelligence, industry, and endurance of the Chinese people, but in the end they will defeat him. He may long have admirers among foreigners who have not had to suffer his rule, but there are not many ardent Maoists in China itself. When Mao dies, the Chinese people will build something different from, and better than, Mao's vision.